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Rukmani: Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita

Dr. Richard De Smet
and Sankara's Advaita
T.S. Rukmani
Concordia University
I HAVE had the privilege of meeting Dr.
Richard De Smet in Shimla at the Indian
Institute of Advanced Study, when we both
participated in a Seminar organized by the
Institute in 1989. We had opportunities of
discussing Sankara's Brahman and the
Christian concept of God at that time
without being able to fully understand each
other's position. That has been at the back of
my mind all these years, and I was happy
when Bradley Malkovsky asked me to write
on Dr. De Smet's view of Sankara's
Brahman for the Bulletin. I thus got an
opportunity to revisit that topic ·again and
have done so in what follows. Needless to
say that, because of the limitation of space, I
have not been able to do full justice to the
topic.
Before I venture to write something on
Dr. De Smet's approach to the ontological
understanding of the Brahman-concept in
Sankara's Advaita Vedanta (hereafter
Advaita), I would ·like .to state what I
understand by comparative work. In order to
do a comparative study of two different
religions o.r theologies, either in a religious
or theological sense, it is not necessary to
somehow fit the ontology·and epistemology
of the two systems being studied to appear

as if they mean the same thing. In such an
approach there is injustice done to both the
systems and one ends up trying to,
sometimes, fit round circles into square
pegs. It is wise to acknowledge that religious.
and theological schools that rise and grow in
different cultural milieus can have a
rationale of their own and the best we can
do, as scholars, is to understand and
appreciate the dynamics of that growth in
their own setting. There is a historical
dimension to every growth, and we sit on
the shoulders of our predecessors such that a
comparative study can only "pretend" to be
an independent, objective approach. A
corollary to that is the question as to whether
the
judgment of
another
philosophy/theology/religion
will
be
acceptable to the other, when the approach is
generally based on the values, concepts,
even the vocabulary and language of the one
who studies the other, which the other need
not or does not recognize.
In Dr. De Smet's case we know that he
was working through the languages in which
the original material of the two schools he
studied was available as for instance,
Sanskrit for Sankara's Advaita and English
or any other language for
the other
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Assuming his competence in these
languages, he still had to transcend the arena
of translations and somehow be able to
creatively intuit the meanings of the foreign
concepts that he intended to compare and
which come with a lot of previous cultural
and intellectual baggage.
.So there are a number of obstacles to
overcome if indeed we cando an honest,
comparative work between two schools of
thought, from two very different cultures.
Because of the above limitations it is easy to
concur with B.K.Matilal's understanding of
comparative work (though he was speaking
with reference to comparative philosophy)
as "the task of explaining and translating
classical Indian philosophical texts in a
Since Sankara , s
western language". 1
Advaita is closer to philosophy than to
theology or religion this is relevant for our
purpose and would come closest to what I
would count as doing a comparative study.
When we take up the question of De
Smet's comparative study of Christianity
and Advaita, all the above thoughts crowd
one's mind. As a Christian theologian, it
became important for De Smet to somehow
find parallels between Advaita, the
paramount philosophical/theologiCal school
in the mind of the Hindus in general, and
Christianity, for, in common. with other
theologians, a deeper theological exchange
between followers of these two spiritual
was
possible
only
when
paths
misconceptions could be cleared away. 2
De Smet's primary loyalty to Christian
theology and his love for Sankara's Advaita
expressed movingly as "From Sankara I
learned to focus on the non-dualistic creative
presence in me - and in all creatures - of the
absolute Brahman as my constant Ground
and Cause and thus Supreme Saksin and
Atman", goaded him to find parallels
between these two systems 3 , one of which is
out and out a theology with belief in a
personal God, who created everything out of
nothing, and the other not a theology in the
strict sense of the term, maybe not a
philosophy as well in the accepted sense of
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the term in the west, but perhaps a
hermeneutic unraveling of the acosmic
(nisprapanca) meanings hidden ill the
Upanisads.
While in Christianity God is the
Supreme; ontological Absolute, Sankara's
Advaita "has no room for gods or deity,
excepting as a provisional posit. It has no
room for God except in the context of a
(metaphysically) ignorant person's inquiry
about the cause of the universe which
unknown to him is only an unreal
appearance (and so is not in need of a
creator).,,4 Thus we are conscious of the
diametrically opposite ways of thinking of
the Ultimate, Ontological Entity, as well as
of
the
different
views
CreationlManifestation, that such divergent
views entail.
In this paper, I try and focus on three
published papers of De Smet, entitled
"Advaitavada and Christianity" (1973)
"Origin:
(hereafter
"Advaitavada,,)5,
Creation and Emanation" (1978) (hereafter
"Origin"),6 and "Forward Steps in Sankara
Research" (1987) (hereafter "Forward
Steps"),7 where he engages in a comparison
of some concepts in Advaita and
Christianity, with a view to arriving at a
convergence. I would have liked to have
more of his publications for this study, but,
unfortunately, these were the only ones
which were readily available. So if there are
other views and revisions presented in any
later papers, I plead guilty for not consulting
them, for in spite of my best efforts, I did
not succeed in procuring them. But I have
had access to the excellent paper on "The
Personhood of Sankara , s Para Brahman"
(1997) by Malkovskl as well as the volume
of
papers
published
(2000),
in
commemoration of the passing away of Dr.
De Smet in 1997 edited by Malkovsky.9
Froin these sources I can surmise that De
Smet did not change or modify his basic
stand from his early publications regarding
his understanding of the concepts in
Advaita, based on which he made the
comparative studies.
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If my reading of De Smet is right, then
the main concern he had was with the
Nirguna nature of Brahman as pure
Consciousness that could not permit the
attribution of a creative function to It. Since
only a person having 'personhood' can have
a relation of creativity to the world,
Christian theologians in general, and De
Smet in particular, who is our focus, try to
find attribution of personhood to the
Nirguna Brahman. De Smet services a
number of devices and uses some selective
readings from Sankara's works to arrive at
the conclusion that it is possible to posit
personhood to Brahman and thus link it with
the manifested world. My task is to see how
far De Smet has succeeded or not in this
enterprise.
As a preamble to this exercise we need
to be clear about some points. Firstly there is
in place a strong hermeneutic tradition set
by the Purvamimamsa school, which is
followed by Sankara as well, in his approach
to the interpretation of the Prasthanatrayi
(Brahmasutra,
Upanisads
and
Bhagavadgita). These principles, though
well known, can suffer repetition as I will
take recourse to them in my explaining
Sankara, whenever it is relevant. These are
the six hermeneutic principles collectively
known as the sadlinga. The first is
upakramopasarnharaikya which is important,
for it denotes an uniformity of meaning
between the start and finish of a sentence, a
section, <;l chapter etc. The second principle
is abhyasa or the repetition of the theme
being discussed in the work; the third is
apurva or a new conclusion. sought to be
brought about; the fourth is phala or the
fruitfulness of such a conclusion; the fifth is
arthavada or agreeing or criticizing it in the
\york; and the sixth is upapatti or the method
Of argumentation. Sankara also uses the
reasonings known as upakrama-parakrama
where the initial statements carry more
weight then the later ones, as also
apaccheda-nyaya, which allows the negation
of the previous statement in case the
subsequent one contradicts itlO. Sankara
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uses these hermeneutic devices to interpret
the Prasthanatrayi in accordance with his
Advaita stance.
Given this importance to the exegetical
tradition of interpretation we cannot afford
to
ignore
Sankara's
methodological
approach to the understanding of each of the
sections (adhikarana) in Badarayana's
Brahmasutras (BS). His commentaries on
the BS as well as the Upanisads (UP) and
the Gita are very often preceded by a
preamble to the concerned section, where he
states his thesis and prepares the reader for
what follows in the subsequent sections of
the particular chapter. He upholds the
principle of ekavakyata or the first
exegetical principle of consistency of the
main thesis throughout the entire work and
frequently refers to it in the body of the
work and in separate sections. It is always
useful to come back to these initial
introductory portions in Sankara, in order to
make sense of some very difficult points that
are raised in the course of the commentaries.
To come back to the paper
"Advaitavada" mentioned above, De Smet
tries to set ilp an analogy between the
Advaita Nirguna Brahman and the God of
Christianity, using mainly the passage 4.3.7.
from the Brhadaranyaka Up. (Br. Up.) for
the understanding of Brahman. De Smet
tries to establish an analogical reading of the
God of Christianity including that of Trinity
and Sankara's Advaita concept of Brahman.
This is one of the pet obsessions of De Smet,
for he again comes back to it in his paper
"Origin." In the "Origin" paper he uses
Aquinas' description of God as 'eminently
Esse (Be)' and the Taittiriya Up. statement
of Brahman being 'satyam, jnanam,
anantam' (Truth, Consciousness, Infinite).ll
He talks about this again in his "Forward
Steps" where he tries to argue for the
identical ontological status of the Christian
God and Advaita Brahman, using a three
level language for approaching both these
transcendent realities. Thus in "Forward
Steps" he believes that Sankara, when he
uses the three levels of adhyasa
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(superimposition), apavada (negation) and
paramartha-laksana (indication by the
supreme sense), is actually talking about a
three level language which can then be taken
to indicate for both Christian God and
Brahman their transcendent nature beyond
the primary meanings of ordinary language
(vyavahara), Upanishadic language which is
metaphysical and metempirical language
which absolutizes words. 12 This almost
sounds like the sphota theory of the
grammarians who absolutize Word as
sabdabrahman. But this not the case in
Sankara, and his opposition to the sphota
concept is well known. De Smet might find
the three levels of adhyasa, apavada and
paramarthata a satisfactory tool to explain
the Christian God, but in Sankara that is not
the use to which adhyasa and apavada are
put to.
Let us now look at Br. Up. 4.3.7 which
Smet uses in "Advaitavada" for this
comparison. Sankara in fact has only two
categories to which he applies the
methodology of adhyasa and apavada, i.e.
Brahman (Atman/Self) and the not-Self. In
Br. Up. 4.3.713. Sankara uses the two
devices mail~ly for an epistemic purpose and
to extend the scope of adhyasa to explain
how the Self functions at a lower level of
reality. The main point here is the identity of
Brahman with the intellect, the symbol of
consciousness. Sankara is concerned with
the way tne reflection of consciousness
functions and illumines the aggregate of
body and organs. He has already declared in
many places the distinction between the
relational and non-relational view of
Reality l4, after stating it as his main thesis in
the Introduction to BS 1.1.1 (thus recalling
to mind the second hermeneutic principle of
abhyasa). He has discussed his methodology
of adhyasa and apavada in BSBh 2.3.6 as
well as in the Gitabhasya 13.14 and
consistently maintains his main thesis in his
commentaries on the Prasthanatrayi. He
adds one more level when talking about
error in the world and dream experiences. IS
To interpret the three or two levels of
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Reality as if they refer to just linguistic
categories is not fair to Sankara's Advaita.
Adhyasa is an overriding concept in
Sankara's Advaita and it cannot be used
selectively to explain some things while
leaving out other things in the system.
We also find Sankara talking about two
kinds of knowledge, and that can only make
sense when the levels they deal with are two
levels of reality 16. Br. Up. Adhyayas
(chapters) three and four are together called
the Yajnavalkyakanda, and they have to be
read together as. one unit, along with
Sankara's commentaries, to understand how
Sankara presents his two-level reality. Thus
in his commentary on Br. Up. 3.4.2 he
clearly states his two-level reality which in
tum only reiterates what has already been
said in 2.4.12, 1.5.3, and in other places.
That Brahman and Atman are One and is the
Higher Reality, while the world and the
selves in it belong to a lower reality, is the
contention of Sankara. De Smet mentions in
"Advaitavada" based on BSBh II.1.9 and
TU. 11.6.1 that "we cannot go on repeating
without ado that Sankara professes the
identity of the individual soul with the
Absolute,,17. While De Smet uses TU II.6.1
which translates as "From that Brahman or
from this Atman was produced Akasa" to
arrive at his conclusion, it is a position
difficult to maintain especially when
Sankara says in his bhasya on the same TU
2.1.1 "From That (Brahman) or from this
Atman came into existence Akasah"
(emphasis mine), i.e. since the word Self
(atman) is used with xegard to Brahman
Itself, it follows that Brahman is the Self of
the
cogmzmg
individual.
Sankara's
commentary on TU 2.1.1 which De Smet
refers to, only confirms Sankara's
conviction about the identity of the Self
(atman) with Brahman and not otherwise.
Repeatedly in that commentary, Sankara
speaks of this identity. It is a long
commentary, and I give below two of his
statements there to that effect. Thus he says
(1) " though' the individual Self is
intrinsically identical to
Brahman... 18 ;
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(2) "thus even though Brahman is one's Self
it
can
remain
unattained
through
ignorance 19; from these two combined with
the statement that "From That Brahman or
from this Atman came into existence Akasah
" it becomes clear that Brahman is identical
with the individual Self.20 So, in Advaita,
there is no distinction between Atman and
Brahman and, therefore, it is not possible to
acquiesce with Smet in this regard.
The rest of "Advaitavada" dwells upon
the making of man in Christianity and goes
on to talk about the" attainment of the
"beatific vision" through the grace of God
and how the individual "ceases to conceive
itself as a being separate from God.
This ... demands no annihilation of its.
dependent existence... ,,21. De Smet tries hard
to restate Sankara's position as follows:
"The too little known anthropology which
Sankara develops around the notion of the
human ego as a reflection of the inner
Witness opens up towards a conception of
man as a totally dependent and contingent
being which is yet strongly integrated" 22.
We can with confidence state that there is a
world of difference not only in the way
humans/Selves are perceived in Advaita, but
also in the nature of liberation, in the means
to liberation and in the identity repeatedly
proclaimed by Sankara's Advaita between
Brahman and Selves. All these are points of
dispute and taken together leave us sceptical
about the comparison between the two
Ultimates and related issues.
In "Origin" De Smet also discusses the
notion of Creation, keeping the three
linguistic, levels in the background. While
the Christian God creates ex nihilo, in
Sankara's Advaita the universe/ exists in
Brahman
before
its
manifestation. 23
Christianity starts with God and then
explains the universe as created by God.
Sankara's philosophical inquiry starts with
the world in order to somehow explain it. He
therefore resorts to adhyasa to retain the
Absolute, Nirgnuna, intrinsic nature of
Brahman. In his introduction to this
adhil<:arana (topic), Sankara states that this

Ii
i
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way of mentioning the ongm etc. of the
universe is only a hermeneutic effort to
clarify TU 3.1; in other words there is no
direct involvement of Brahman with the
world. Thus it is not possible to agree with
De Smet when he says " ...the mind is ready
to climb to the level of eminence (the
Dionysian
Hyperoche
or
Sankarian
paramarthapatti) and to say, for instance,
with Aquinas : Creation is the emanation of
the whole universe by and from the
universal Cause ... ,,24. De Smet also wants to
eliminate the weak sense of "production" as
"mete manifestation" [of the universe]. This
is too tall an order. Manifestation is not
Sankara's formulation
at all.
This
understanding is part of the Vedic tradition
and is a basic tenet of practically all schools
of religious thought in Hinduism. Therefore
Sankara believes in a cyclical origin,
sustenance and dissolution of the universe
and
also
that
successive
creations/manifestations take place as a
result of virtue and vice and come into
existence like the earlier ones. 25 Sankara
discusses this elaborately in BSBh 2.1.10;
therefore it cannot be wished away and
certainly not in Sankara's Advaita.
At another level De Smet, in the same
paper, uses the "satkaryavada" (the preexistence of the effect in the cause) to
valorize St Thomas' statement of "a
creature as pre-existing in God is the divine
Essence itself ,26. There is a considerable.
mixing up of categories in this statement.
Sankara nowhere states that Brahman is the
locus of the Atman, which, l:?y the way, is
also not a creature as understood by
Aquinas, but always and consistently
Sankara maintains Atman's identity with
Brahman. I have also a problem when De
Smet argues for understanding time at two
levels (1) Universal time as an abstraction
and (2) "concrete time [which] is co-created
with the universe since, being a property of
its being, it does not precede it but rather
follows from its essential mobility and
.evolving changeability'. Whether it starts
from a' first instant or is beginning1ess
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depends entirely on the Creator's free
decision and cannot be settled by any
deductive pr6cess',27. There is again a
category mistake in this argument. All this
can make sense only in the context of
"Creation talk" and the "notion of the first
instant of the universe". De Smet also says
that ontological origination does not itself
imply temporal beginning even if the reverse
is true. It is obvious, as already mentioned,
that all this can only make sense in a
Christian context, where there is a positive
temporal origination of the universe. For
Sankara the whole discussion of the origin
of time or the universe, whether ontological
or temporal is irrelevant, as it is within the
domain of avidya.
De Smet comes back to the Creator
notion of Christianity in a discussion of the
nature of the effects of creation. In his paper
"Origin" he ties the creatures to the idea of
upadhis in Advaita, and one need not quarrel
with that. But it is difficult to agree with his
conclusion of the "creatures' total
dependence on their Creator" in the context
of Advaita. De Smet brings in the concept
of grace in Advaita (I will touch upon that
briefly later),·· combining it with the
unsubstantiated theory. of creation in
Advaita. When De Smet quotes BS II.l.25
and translates it as the "Supreme
Atman ... creates ... ", it is important to recall
Sankara's introduction of Isvara in the act of
creation, preservation and destruction in BS
1.1.2. Thus, he says "It is not possible to
imagine any other than this kind of qualified
Isvara Ifor the creation of this kind of
qualified universe"z8. He clearly establishes
that, according to him it is )svara, and not
Brahman, that is associated with janma
(origin), sthiti (maintenance) and laya
(destruction) of the universe. As for 11.1.25
which is used by De Smet to undergird his
creation hypothesis, Sankara has already
stated as a preamble to this topic before 11.1
that "the omniscient omnipotent Sarvesvara
is the cause of the universe ... " and using the
principles of both upakramopasamharaikya
(unity of meaning in the section), abhyasa
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(repetition of what has already been
introduced)
and
upakrama-parakrama
(where . 'initial statements in general carry
more weight than subsequent ones) we have
to understand that here also it is Isvara that
is indicated. The debate is furthered in
11.1.27 by stating that Brahman remains
unchanged and beyond phenomenal actions,
and all this is imagined through ignorancez9 .
Many statements from the BS and the
Upanisads that De Smet uses to compare
Christianity and the Advaita of Sankara are
difficult to reconcile precisely because of
Sankara's own devices of avidya (adhyasa),
nirguna/saguna Brahman, maya etc. There
are statements both in the BS and the UP
which can be profitably compared to
Christianity, but those would be closer to
Visistadvaita or Dvaita and not Advaita.
Thus, we have to disagree with De Smet
when he states that "we can now with St.
Thomas define creation adequately and
eminently (paramarthatah) as the intelligent
and freely willed emanation of the whole
reality or positivity of the universe from the
pure Esse" 30.
In the same paper "Origin" there is
mention of tadatmya, and De Smet's
understanding of it, based on BS II.1.14, is
as follows. " ...the non-difference implied by
tadatmya does not eliminate distinction but
stresses the ontological character. of the
creature's dependence as well as the
Creator's transcendence." 31 BS II. 1. 14 has
been explained at length by Sankara. The
sutra in translation reads, 'There is
ananyatva (non-difference) of those (cause
and effect) because of the texts on origin
etc ... " The examples that Sankara brings in
here are spaces within pots and jars being
non-different from all-pervading akasah, and
water in a mirage being non-different from a
sandy desert. In his commentary Sankara
stresses the "elimination of distinction"
between the Self and Brahman. Sankara
again brings in Isvara in this context, who
alone can be associated with creation etc.,
and reiterates the 'identity or non-difference
of the Selves with Brahman.

6
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Continuing the discussion on tadatmya,
De Smet uses TU 11.6.1 and Sankara's
commentary on it to substantiate his claim.
He translates one line of this really long
commentary as "names and forms in all their
states have Brahman alone as their Atman,
but Brahman has not its Atman in them (i.e.,
tadatmya is not mutual).,,32 There is a
misunderstanding of the word tadatmakam
here by De Smet. I translate below the text
in question: 33
Thus it is because of Brahman
alone that nama and rupa have their
being in all conditions; but Brahman
is not of their nature [but Brahman
does not consist of them, according
to Gambhirananda]; they are said to
have their being in Brahman in
essence, because they are "no more"
[cease to exist, according to
Gambhirananda] when Brahman is
eliminated. By these two limiting
conditions, Brahman is the agent of
all empirical experiences such as
knower, knowable and knowledge
etc., and all that it entails.
Now the word tadatmakam is a
compound (samasa)
and an adjective
qualifying Brahman, and the part tat stands
for namarupa and not for Brahman.
Atmakam means "made up or composed of,
of the nature or character of" etc. Therefore
na tadatmakam cannot be translated as
"Brahman does not have its Atman in them"
as De Smet does. It is like the word
rasatmakam in vakyam rasatmakam kavyam
(A sentence that has the character of rasa is
literature).34 Tadatmakam indicates that
Brahman is not of the nature of namarupa
and not that Brahman has not Atman in
them. Sankara also makes reference to the
topic under discussion by drawing our
attention to the introduction to this whole
section in the TU and indicating that the
topic under discussion is that the Self is
imagined to enter the very cavity (of the
heart). He thus makes use. of the
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hermeneutic principle of ekavakyata and
also reiterates (abhyasa) that the topic l;>eing
examined is the knowledge of Brahma,n.. 35
I have spent some time explaining this at
length because it is also quoted by
Malkovsky in his paper titled "The
Personhood of Samkara's Para Brahman".36
As this paper is concerned mainly with De
Smet's arguments I will not engage
Malkovsky's points raised in his paper.
So the tadatmya or the unique. identity
between Brahman and Atrnan is what
Sankara repeatedly emphasizes. He uses the
example of the mistaken identity between
the rope/snake or shell/silver in order to
illustrate this unique relation. The relation
between the rope and snake is neither
difference, as we cannot relate two different
terms as snake and rope as "This is snake",
nor non-difference since the rope is
empirically real while the snake is only
apparently so; therefore there can be no
relation of identity between "two levels of
being". It is, therefore, a unique relation
known as tadatmya. If, in the above, the
rope IS denied the snake "Is not"; but if the
snake is denied (due to realizing one's
mistake) the rope "Is". Thus, if we apply the
same understanding to TU II.6.1, Brahman
is the same as the rope, and therefore It
underlies everything; but Brahman as
namarupa does not underlie them, i.e. isnot
of their nature, since once namarupa is
transcended through knowledge it vanishes
and Brahman alone "Is". This is another
example of adhyasa and also made clear in
Br. Up. IV.3.7 and Sankar~'s commentary
on it with which De Smet starts the
argument in "Advaitavada" and mentioned
earlier. 37
Since the question of grace occurs in all
the three papers under consideration I will
briefly touch upon it here. De Smet uses BS
2.3.41 and Sankara's commentary thereon
for support of Sankara's acceptance of
divine grace, both in "Origin" and "Forward
Steps,,38 . One has only to read the entire
commentary on 2.3.41 to know that Sankara
does not support what De Smet believes he

7
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does. The commentaries on 2.3.41 and
2.3.42 have to be read together to make
sense. Firstly, it is Isvara, and not Brahman,
whose anugraha (grace) is under discussion.
Secondly, Sankara continues the same topic
in the next sutra and says "(Isvara) is
however dependent on the jiva's efforts, so
that injunctions and prohibitions are not
meaningless and other defects do not
arise,,39 . In his commentary Sankara clearly
states that Isvara makes the jiva act now in
accordance with its past karma, and He
directed him earlier in accordance with what
he did earlier, and so on. So, since samsara
is without beginning, this is without fault.
We can thus see that it is difficult to read
divine grace in Advaita. Grace has to be
showered o"n one without any pre-attached
conditions, and that is not the case in
Sankara's Advaita. 40
This brief examination of the above
papers of Dr.De Smet has shown that he has
not been able to make a case for either the
personhood of Sankara's Advaita Brahman,
nor for the origin of the seen universe, both
of which differs radically from the Christian
God and from creation ex nihilo. De Smet
tried hard to find parallels between
Christianity and Sankara's Advaita, but he
was dealing with two entirely different
systems of thought. Just as in the
understanding of Christianity one has to
look at all the aspects of its theology, so
also, in order to correctly comprehend
Advaita, i( is necessary to read Sankara's
commentaries as a whole in order to arrive
at an understanding of Advaita in all its
dimensions. Selective use of a line here or
there cannot help in the long run. This, in
no way belittles the sincere efforts of Dr. De
Smet who genuinely sought parallels in the
two systems. While new interpretations are
always welcome they have to be in
conformity with the understanding of the
scholar they seek to interpret. Gadamer's
insightful observations regarding what
hermeneutics entails is true of all such
exercises: 41
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Historical
[philosophical]
understanding, .. .is the action of
subjectivity purged of all prejudices,
and it is achieved in direct
proportion to the knower's ability to
set aside his own horizons by means
of an effective historical method... .Is
it the case ... that the knower can
leave his immediate situation in the
present merely by adopting an
attitude?
Shaped by the past in an infinity of
unexamined ways, the present
situation is the "given" in which
understanding is rooted, and which
reflection can never entirely hold at
a critical distance and objectify.
Only a neutralized, prejudice-free
consciousness
guarantees
the
objectivity of knowledge.
Dr.De Smet was a Christian theologian
and though sincere in his approach to
Sankara and in his efforts to understand
Sankara's Advaita Vedanta, could not rid
himself of his "prejudices". His efforts,
therefore, to reinterpret Brahman, tadatmya,
adhyasa, and other Sankarian terms and
concepts, in order to bring Sankara's
Advaita closer to Christian theology, have
not yielded the desired result, in my view.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

Satchidananda
Murty,
Philosophy in India: Traditions,
Teaching and Research (New
Delhi: Indian Council of
Philosophical Research, 1999
reprint), p. 204.
Cf. Bradley Malkovsky, "The
Personhood of Samkara's Para
Brahman," The Journal of
Religion 77 (1997):547.
Bradley
Malkovsky,
"Introduction: The. Life and
Work of Richard V. De Smet,

8

~
'I
I

Rukmani: Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita

I

Ii

20 T.S. Rukmani

I,!

il'l I:,I

i :!
j

,i

I

I

\ 'I,

'I
I,"

I',

!:

I

, ,I

I
II

i

4.

I"

Ii

Ii
5.
I
!

•

6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

SJ.," New Perspectives on
Advaita Vedanta: Essays in
Commemoration of Professor
Richard De Smet, S.J., ed.
Bradley Malkovsky (Leiden:
Brill, 2000), p. 11.
J. N. Mohanty, "Advaita
Vedanta as Philosophy and as
Religion,"
Explorations
in
Philosophy: Essays by IN.
Mohanty. Volume I: Indian
Philosophy, ed. Bina Gupta,
(Oxford:
Oxford University
Press 2002, 2nd ed.), p. 107.
R.V. De Smet, "Advaitavada
and, Christianity," The Divine
Life 35 (1973):237-239.
R.V.
De Smet, "Origin:
Creation
and
Emanation,"
Indian Theological Studies 15
(1978):266-279.
R.V. De Smet, "Forward Steps
III Sankara Research", Pratap
Seth Endowment Lecture on
Sankara Vedanta, Darshana
International 26 (1987):33-46.
Cf. note 2, above.
Cf. note 3, above.
Satchidananda
Murty,
Revelation and Reason in
Advaita Vedanta (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1974), pp. 81-87.
De Smet, "Origin," p. 275.
De Smet, "Forward Steps," pp.
pp.44-45.
Br. Up. 4.3.7. in translation
reads: "Which is the Self? This
(purusa) which is identified with
the intellect is in the midst of
the organs, the (self-effulgent)
light within the heart (intellect). -.
Assuming the likeness (of the
intellect) it moves between the
two worlds; it thinks as it were,
and shakes, as it were. Being
identified with dreams, it
transcends the forms of death
(ignorance etc.)." (Translation

Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2003

i:,

14.

15.
16.

17.
18.

19.

by Swami Madhavananda, The
Brhadaranyakopanisad with the
commentary of Sankaracarya,
Almora: Advaita Ashrama,
1950.)
Sankara
in
his
commentary on the above talks
about the reflection of the Self
(consciousness) in the intellect,
mind, sense organs and the body
by which the entire, insentient
complex of body-sense organsintellect is illuminated by
consciousness. Sankara also
says
this
superimposItIon
(adhyasa) is mutual.
"The Self cannot be taken
apart from anything else like a
stalk of grass from its sheath,
and shown in its self-effulgent
form. It is for this reason that
the whole world, to its utter
delusion,
superimposes
all
activities peculiar to name and
form on the Self, and all
attributes of this self-effulgent
light on name and form."
Translation
by
R.
Balasubramanian, History of
Science,
Philosophy
and
Culture in Indian Civilization.
Volume II, Part 2:, Advaita
Vedanta (New Delhi: Centre for
Studies in Civilizations, 2000).
Commentaries on BS.I.12;
Chand Up. 3.14.2; Br. Up.
2.3.6; 4.4.15;, Kena Up. 4.4;
Taitt. Up. 2.4.1; 2.
B.S.Bh. ILl.4; IV.3.14.
Commentaries on Mund.Up.
Ll.4 and 5; Br. Up. 3.5.l;
Chand. Up. 6.2.1.
"Advaitavada," p. 239.
paramarthato
brahmasvarupasyapi satah asya
jivasya ...
evamavidyaya atmabhutamapi
brahma 'anaptam syat.

9

J

¥
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies, Vol. 16 [2003], Art. 6

Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita 21

20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

'tasmadva etasmadatmanah' iti
brahmanyeva
atmasabdaprayo gat
vedituratmaiva brahma.
"Advait~l.Vada," p. 238
Ibid., p. 239
B.S.Bh. I. 2. 22.
"Origin," p. 269.
B.S.Bh. I. 3. 30; II. 1. 10
"Origin," p. 269.
Ibid., pp. 272-73.
na
ca
yathoktavisesanasya
jagato
yathoktavisesanamisvaram
muktva
anyatah ... sambhavayitum
sakyate.
avidyakalpitar'upabhedabhyupagamt; avidyakalpitena ca
namarupalaksanena ... tattvanyat
vabhyamanirvacaniyena
brahmaparinamadisarvavyavah
araspadatvam
pratipadyate;
paramarthikena
brahma
parinamarthikena ca rupena
sarvavyavaharatitamaparinata
mavatisthate.
"Origin", pp. 276-77.
Ibid., p. 279.
Ibid., p. 279.
atah namarupe sarvavasthe
na
brahmanaivatmavati.
brahma
tadatmakam.
te
tatpratyakhyane na sta eveti
tadakmake ucyete. tabhyam ca
upadhibhyam
jnatrjneyajnanasabdarthadisarv
asamvyavaharabhagbrahma.

https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol16/iss1/6
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1295

34.

35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

41.

Sahitya Darpana 1, cited in
V .M.Apte' s
The Practical
Sanskrit-English
Dictionary
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1992), p. 355.
kimarthamasthane
carca.
prakrto hyanyo vivaksito'sya
vak-yarthah asti. sa smartavyah
- brahmavidapnoti param ..
"The Personhood ... ," p. 559.
Cf. note 13 above.
"Origin," pp. 273-74; "Forward
Steps," p. 37.
krtaprayatnapeksastu
vihitapratisiddhavaiyarthyadibh
yah.
api ca purvapraytnamapeksya
idanim karayati purvataram ca
prayatnamapeksya
purvamakarayaditi
anaditvatsamsarasyeti
anavadyam.
David
Linge,
"Editor's
Introduction" to Hans Georg
Gadamer,
Philosophical
Hermeneutics, Translated and
Edited
by
David
Linge
of
(Berkeley:
University
California Press, 1976),xiv-xvi.

10

